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GOYTIA v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 
Cite as 464 P .2d 47 
Cal. 47 
83 Cal.Rptr. 591 
Rilth GOYTIA, Petitioner, 
Y. 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS 
BOARD and California Packing Cor-
poration, Respondents. 
S. F.22676. 
Supreme Court of, California, 
In Bank. 
Jan. 30, 1970. 
As Modlt!ed on Denial of Rebearing 
Feb. 25, 1970. 
Workmen's compensation claimant 
sought annulment, of decision after recon· 
sideratian by Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peals Board reducing her award of perma-
nent disability benefits. The Supreme Court, 
Tobriner, ]., held that where workmen's 
compensation claimant had worked part-
time for many years so that she, could re-
main at home with her children, but, ~fter 
sustaining injury to wrist and hand result-
ing in permanent disability, and after two 
o~ her children had married and the third 
had entered last year of high school, she 
obtain.ed full-time permanent. employment, 
Board, in determining permanent disability 
award, should have considered claimant's 
ea~ning capacity as demonstrated by her 
ability to hold a .full-time permanent job. 
Decision of -Workmen's Compensation 
Board annulled and case remanded for fur-
ther proceedings, 
Traynor, C. J., McComb and Burke, JJ., 
diss~nted. 
I. Workmen's Compensation ~1802, -1821 
Purpose of statute directing that any 
decision of Workmen's Compensation Ap-
. peals Board affirming, rescinding or amend-
ing original award by Appeals Board or 
referee following reconsideration shall 
specify in detail reasons for decision is to 
assist reviewing court to ascertain prin-
ciples relied upon by lower tribunal to help 
avoid careless or arbitrary action and to 
make right of appeal more ,meaningful. 
West's Ann.Labor Code, § 5908.5. 
2. Workmen's Compensation ¢;)182f 
Detennination of Workmen's Compen-
sation Appeals Board that after its "due 
consideration" of postinjury earnings, sllch 
earnings should be discarded as inconclu-
sive violated labor code provision requir-
ing Board to specify in detail reasons for 
the decision. West's Ann.Labor Code, 
§ 5908.5. 
3. Workmen's Compensation ~19 
W_ithin statute providing that if other 
methods of arriving at average weekly earn-
ings cannot be fairly applied, such earnings, 
shall be taken at 95% of sum which reason-
ably represents -average weekly earning 
capacity of employee at time of his injury, 
due consideration being given to his actual 
earnings, "earning capacity" is not restrict-
ed to actual earnings on date of injury but 
contemplates employee's 'general over-all 
capability. West's Ann.Labor Code, § 4453 
(d). 
See publication 'Vords and Pbrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Workmen's Compensation ~840 
Workmen's Compensation Appeals 
Board must consider postinjury earnings in 
awarding permanent disability benefits. 
West's Ann.Labor Code, § 4453(d). 
5. Workmen's Compensation ~21 
Where workmen's" compensation claim-
ant had worked part-'time for many years 
so that she could remain at home with her 
children but, after sustaining injury to wrist 
and h"and resulting in permanent disability 
and after two of her children had married 
and a third had entered last year of high 
school, she obtained fult-time permanent 
employment, Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peals Board, in determining permanent dis-
ability award;' should have considered 
claimant's earning "capacity as demonstrat-
ed by her ability to hold a full-time perma-
nent job. West's Ann.Labor Code, § 4453 
(d). 
Morgan, Beauzay & Hammer and Robert 
T. Bledsoe, San Jose, for petitioner-; Barry 
Satzman, Los Angeles, as amicus curiae. 
Everett A. Corten, Jon L. Gateley, San 
Francisco, Edmund D. Leonard and Daw· 
son B. -Leonard, Orinda, for respondents. 
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TOBRINER, Justice. 
Petitioner seeks annulment of a decision 
after reconsideration by the Workmen's 
Compensation Appeals Board which reduced 
her award of permanent disability benefits. 
The appeals board, basing its determination 
upon her pre-injury earnings, rated peti-
tioner's earning capacity for purposes of 
permanent disability as minimum. We can-
not ascertain from the ambiguous decision 
of the board whether or not in so doing it 
considered sllch earning capacity of peti-
tioner as disclosed by earnings subsequent 
to the injury; we believe that such con-
sideration is required by the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. We must therefore an-
nul the decision. 
The petitioner, Ruth Goytia. sustained an 
injury to her right wrist and hand on April 
IS, 1966, while employed by the California 
Packing Corporation (now Del Monte 
Corporation}. Prior to her injury peti-
tioner had worked as a seasonal packing 
house worker for the California Packing 
Corporation for several years with suffi-
cient earnings to entitle her only to the 
minimum compensation rate of $20 per 
week. Subsequent to her injury, in July 
1967, petitioner obtained full-time perma-
nent employment at San Jose Hospital as a 
cashier, with earnings of approximately 
$81.90 per week. Her earnings on her ful1-
time job sufficed to produce a compensation 
rate of $50.57 per week. 
About one year later, on July 22, 1968, 
a referee for the appeals board held a hear-
ing to -determine the extent of petitioner's 
permanent disability resulting from her 1%6 
injury. After a second hearing on Novem-
ber 7, 1968, the referee issued a rating of 
15V2 percent, and on December 11, 1968, 
he filed his supplemental findings and 
award, including a finding that petitioner's 
Ilearning capacity for purposes of perma-
nent disability is $81.90 per week," award-
ing her permanent disability indemnity at 
the rate of $50.57 per week. In his opinion 
on decision the referee noted that prior to 
her injury petitioner's earnings had been 
minimum, but that her subsequent employ-
ment record had demonstrated an earning 
capacity equivalent to $81.90 per week for 
purposes of permanent disability. 
The appeals board granted Del Monte's 
petition for reconsideration and thereafter 
annulled the referee's decision. The board 
found petitioner's earning capacity to be 
minimum and awarded her permanent dis-
ability indemnity at the rate of $20 per 
week. In its opinion the appeals board 
stated its' reasoning: IIWe have carefully 
reviewed the record in this matter. Ap-
plicant was employed by Del Monte in its 
cannery operation. The evidence in the 
record is that applicant worked seasonably 
for about twenty years prior to the time of 
her injury. Following her industrial in-
jury she remained off work for some time 
and then secured full-time employment be-
cause her children had grown older and no 
longer needed her attention. Section 4453 
(d) of the Labor Code provides that the 
average weekly earning capacity of the 
injured employee shall be determined at the 
time of his injury. At the time of her in-
jury applicant's earnings were admittedly 
minimum. We are therefore granting re-
consideration to annul the finding that earn-
ings were at the maximum rate, to find 
applicant's earnings were at the minimum 
rate and to correct the award accordingly." 
At the threshold we must meet the con-
tention of the appeals board in its answer to 
the petition that its opinion shows that it 
had "carefully reviewed the record in this 
matter," that lithe evidence considered by 
the Board included her [petitioner's] ob-
taining of 'full-time employment because 
her children had grown older and no long-
er needed her attention'" and that it had 
properly found applicant's earnings were at 
the minimum rate. The opinion, however, 
offers no such clear affirmation of the 
board's position but presents alternative 
possibilities, either of which is vulnerable. 
The board's decision may rest upon the 
proposition that the actual earnings of ap-
plicant at the date of -injury, and not her 
earning capacity, determine the rate, and 
that therefore "due consideration" to post-
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injury earnings need not be given. In that pra, 68 Cal.2d 753, 755, 68 CaI.Rptr. 825, 
event, as we shall explain, the_opinion mis- 826, 441 P.Zd 633, 634.} Evans has been 
conceives Labor Code section 4453, sub- specifically applied to situations similar 
division (d). On the other hand, the opin- to the present one in Granado v. Work-
ion may represent the determination of the men's Compo App. Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 
board, after its "due consideration" of post- 399, 406, 71 ~al.Rptr. 678, 445 P.2d 294, 
injury earnings, that such earr1ings should and Lundberg v. Workmen's Compo App. 
be discarded as inconclusive. In that case, Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 436, 440-441, 71 Cal. 
the board's cryptic pronouncement, as we Rptr .. 684, 445 P.2d 300. 
shall show, violates section 5908.5 of the Indeed, the instant case symbolizes the 
Labor Code, 'Yhich requires that the board vice of the neglect of the rule: in reading 
/I * * * state the evidence relied upon and the narrative account of applicant's work 
specify in detail the reasons- for the de- history one cannot authoritatively tell 
cision." whether the board did or did not give any 
[1,2} We first examine the second alter-
native. We repeat a proposition that th~s 
court has stated on numerous occasions: 
the board must observe the mandate of sec-
tion 5908.5. Evans v. Workmen's Camp. 
App. Bd. (1968) 68 CaI.2d 753, 68 CaI.Rptr. 
825, 4-11 P.2d 633, carefully explains that 
"Section 5908.'5 of the Labor Code directs 
that 'Any decisidn of the appeals board 
granting or denying a petition for recon-
sideration or affirming, rescinding, altering, 
or amending the original findings, order, 
decision, or award foUo'lI:ing reconsidera-
tion shall be made by the appeals board and 
not by a referee and shall be in writing 
* * * and shall state the e'Uiden;e relied 
upon and specify in' detail the reasons for 
the decision.' (Italics added.)" (P. 755. 
68 CaI.Rptr. at p. 826, 441 P.2d at p. 634.) 
This court then set fo~th the rationale for 
its position: "The purpose of the require-
ment that evidence be stated and reasons 
detailed appears analogous to that of the 
requirement of section 1705 of the Public 
Utilities Code that decisions of the Public 
Utilities Commission contain sepat:ately 
stated findings of the basic facts upon all 
material issues. It is to assist the reviewing 
court to ascertain the principles relied upon 
by the lower tribunal, to help that tribunal 
avoid careless or arbitrary action, and to 
make the right of appeal or of seeking re ... 
view more meaningful. (Greyhot1nd Lines, 
Inc. V. Public Utilities Com. (1967) 65 Cal. 
2d 811, 813, 56 CaI.Rptr. 484, 423 P.2d 556.)" 
(Evans v. Workmen's Camp. App.Bd., su-
464 P.2d-4 
consideration to the evidence of subsequent 
earnings. The board's conclusionary state-
ment does not suffice to inform this court 
of its specific holding or the basis for it. 
It offers no scintilla of reason for refusing 
to fix the rate in accordance with peti-
tioner's subsequent earnings, if it .did give 
such earnings "due consideration," and 
such omission is the more flagrant in view 
of the statutory obligations of the board, 
which we discuss infra. 
The alternative construction of the 
board's opinion, which appears to us the 
more likely, is that it decided that the ac-
tual earnings of the petitioner at the date 
of the injury determine the rate without 
regatd to subsequent earnings. Thus the 
board states that "At the time of her injury 
applicant's earnings were admittedly mini-
mum.'" That statement do-es not mention 
petitioner's earning capacity at the time of 
injury. Yet section 4453. subdivision (d), 
fixes "the average weekly earning capaci-
ty" as the ·basis for determining perma-
nent disability rating. Nevertheless, the 
board states that petitioner's earnings "at 
the time of her injury" being "admittedly 
minimum," it "therefore" grants "reconsid-
eration to annul the finding" as to earn-
ings. 
[3] Earning capacity is not locked into 
a strait-jacket of the actual earnings of the 
worker at the date of injury; the term con-
templates his general over-all capability and 
productivity; the term envisages a dynam-
ic, not a static. test and cannot be com-
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pressed into earnings at a given moment 
of time. The term does not cut "capacity" 
to the procrustean bed of the earnings at 
the date of injury. A comparison of the 
first three subdivisions of section 4453 with 
the fourth shows that the Legislature de-
liberately established earning capacity as 
the test for the fourth subdivision as dis-
tinguished from the actual earnings for the 
other three subdivisions. Section 4453 pro-
vides for the computation of both tempo-
rary and permanent disability indemnity. 
Subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) 1 relate to 
,full-time employees, employees working 
for two or more employers, and employ-
ment at an irregular rate, such as piece-
work or work on a commission basis. Each 
of those subdivisions provide for compu-
tation of "average annual earnings for pur-
poses of permanent disability indemnity" 
based upon earnings prior to the injury. 
Section 4453, subdivision (d), applicable 
here, provides as follows: "Where the em-
ployment is for less than 30 hours per week, 
or where for any reason the foregoing 
methods of arriving at the average weekly 
earnings cannot --reasonably and fairly be 
applied, the average weekly earnings shall 
be taken at 95 percent of the sum which 
reasonably represents, the average weekly 
earning capacity of the injured employee 
at the time of his injury, due consideration 
I. "In. computing nverl)ge annual earnings 
for the purposes of temporary disability 
indemnity only, the average weekly earn-
ings shall be taken at not less than thirty-
eight dollars amI forty-six cents ($38.46) 
nor more than one hundretl seven dollars 
and sixty-nine cents ($107.69). In com-
puting average annual earnings for pur-
poses of permanent disability indemnity, 
the average weekly earnings shall be 
taken at not less than thirty dollars and 
seventy-seven cents ($30.77) Dar more 
than eighty dollars anll seventy-seven 
cents ($80.77). Between these limits the 
average weekly earnings, except as pro-
vided in Sections 4456 to 4459, shall be 
arrived at as follows: (a) "There the 
employment is for 80 or more bours a 
week and for five or more working days a 
week, tbe average weekly earnings shall be 
95 percent of the number of working days 
a week times the daily earnings at the 
being given to· his actual earnings from all 
sources and employments." (Italics added.) 
The language of the statute leads to two 
conclusions: first, average weekly earn-
ings under subdivision (d) differs from 
average weekly earnings under the other 
three subdivisions; subdivision (d) ap-
plies., "where the employment is for less 
than 30 hours per week, or where for any 
reason the, foregoing methods .. .. .. 
cannot re~sonably and fairly be applied." 
(Italics added.) Since the prior three sub-
div,i.sions calculate average weekly earn-
ings solely on the basis of prior earnings, 
the statute apparently contemplated that 
prior earnings are not the sole basis for 
the. determination of earning capacity 'or 
average weekly earnings under subdvision 
(d). 
Secondly, subdivision (d) s~ates that in 
d~termining average weekly earning ca-
pacity the appeals board should give "due 
consideration" to actual earnings "from 
all sources and _ employments." Pre-injury 
_earnings constitute one factor, but not the 
exclusive factor, in _ determining such earn-
ings. The subdivision in alluding to earn-
ing "capacity" must necessarily refer to 
~arning potential which may not, and prob-
ably will not, be reflected by prior part-
time earnings. 
time of the injury. (b) 'Vhere the em-
ployee is working for two or more em-
ployers at or about the time of the injury, 
the average weekly earnings shall be 
taken as 95 percent of the aggregate of 
such earnings from all employments com-
puted in terms of one week; but the 
earnings from employments other than the 
employment in which the injury occurred 
shall not be taken at a higher rate than 
the hourly rate Paid at the time of the 
lDJury. (c) If the earnings are at aD ir-
regular rate. such as piecework, or on a 
commission basis, or arc specified to be 
.by tbe week, month or otber period, tben 
,the average weekly earnings mentioned in 
subdivision (a) above shall be taken a8 
95 percent of the actual weekly earnings 
averaged for such a period of time, not 
e:x;ceeding one' year, as may conveniently 
be taken to determine nn average weekly 
rate of pay." (§ 4453.) . -___ _ 
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In the important case of Argonaut Ins. post-injury earnings in order to, increase 
Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1962) 57 Cal. its appraisal of sllch earning capacity. In 
2d 589, 21 Cal.Rptr. 545, 371 P.2d 409, some- equating capacity to earn with earnings at 
times referred to as the "Montana" case, the time of injury, the board's construc-
this court has insisted upon a realistic tion substantially conflicts with the precept 
appraisal of earnings under subdivision (d). of Argonaut. 
There we considered the appli~"tion of the 
subdivision in the case of fan applicant, 
Montana, who prior to his injury had 
worked intermittently over a period of 
years as a construction laborer. We an-
nulled an award of permanent disability 
based upon a finding of maximum earning 
capacity stemming solely from an unusually 
high wage which Montana happened to be 
earning at the time of injury. We stated 
that "An estimate of earning capacity is 
a prediction of what an employee's earnings 
would have been had he not been injured. 
.. * * In making a permanent award, 
long-term earning history is a· reliable 
guide in predicting earning capacity, al-
though in a variety of fact situations 
. earning history alone may be mislea,ding. 
• • • [A]l! facts relevant and helpful 
to making the estimate must be considered 
[citations]. The applicant's ability to work, 
his age and health, his willingness and op-
portunities to work, his skill and education, 
the general condition of the labor market, 
and employment opportunities for persons 
similarly situated are all relevant." (Italics 
added) (57 Cal.2d 589, 594-595, 21 Cal. 
Rptr. 545, 548, 371 F.2d 409, 412.) 
[4] Although Argonaut did not involve 
the specific question we face here, whether 
the appeals board should .consider post-
injury earnings in awarding- perm.a:nent di,s-
ability, its language, emphasizipg the 'im-
portance of determinirig true earning' ca-
pacity based upon ','all facts relevant ~~d 
helpful" and recognizing that "earning his-
tory alone may be misleading," indicates 
that post-injury earnings forth a legitimate 
area for consideration in determining earn-
ing capacity. If, as in Argonaut, the board 
may reduce an appraisal of earning capacity 
based exclusively upon immediately pre-in-
jury earnings because of the total history of 
the applicant, it must by the same token pos-
sess the corollary power to take into account 
Other courts have applied the definition 
of earning capacity as used in subdivision 
(d). In Colonial Mut. Compensation Ins. 
Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1941) 47 
Cal.App.2d 487, 118 P.2d 361, the Court of 
Appeal condemned the use of wages actu-
ally received during the preceding year 
as the sole basis for determining a tempo-
rary disability award. The court stated: 
"As will be noted, under the above pro-
visions [section 4453, subdivision (d)] it 
is the average weekly earning capacity at 
the time of the injury which is the basis 
for determining average weekly earnings, 
which, in turn, provides the measure for 
computing the disability payment; and 
while it is doubtless the law that in deter-
mining the average weekly earning capac-
ity at the time' of the injury, due considera-
tion is to be given to earnings in the past, 
such earnings are not the controlling factor 
in determining earning capacity" (47 Cal. 
App.2d 487, 490, ll8 P.2d 361, 363). 
In Colonial the Court of Appeal quoted 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. 
(1933) 130 Cal.App. 488, 491-492, 20 P.2d 
372, and California. Casualty Indemnity 
Exchange v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1933) 
135 :CaI.App. 746, 752, 27 P.2d 782, to the 
effect,that "'average weekly earning ca-
pacity . * * * should be construed to 
mean that the wages of the employee which 
were :actually earned during the year, to-
gether with all the surrounding circum-
stances affecting his earning ability, should 
be considered . in ascertaining a figure 
which 'will reasonably represent his weekly 
earning capacity. Capacity to' earn money 
necessarily contemplates all the surrounding 
circumstances and conditions disclosed by 
the evi~ence which may indicate one's usual 
and. ordinary ability to earn wages, includ-
ing his physical ability, his natural talents, 
his training, his opportunity to secure em-
52 Cal. 464 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ployment, and the condition of his health' " 
(47 Ca1.App.2d 487, 491-492, 118 P.2d 361, 
363-364). 
The appeals board itself has specifically 
interpreted subdivision (d) to permit con-
sideration of post-injury earnings. In Dole 
v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1966) 31 Cal.Comp. 
Cases 41, writ denied, the employee, ,Pargaz, 
injured himself in 1963 while working as a 
part-time cannery worker. Pargaz had 
previously worked from 1956 to 1959 full-
time for another employer. From 1959 
until his injury, however, he' had 'worked 
sporadically, his highest annual earnings 
being $1,400 in 1963. The referee found 
that Pargaz's employment was seasonal 
and would have continued only four more 
weeks after his injury j he therefore 
awarded Pargaz temporary disability at 
$40 for four weeks and at the minimum rate 
of $25 thereafter. 
By the time of the hearing on permanent 
disability in March of 1965, Pargaz had 
obtained full-time employment as a school 
custodian at a salary of $387 per month. 
Thereafter the referee awarded Pargaz 
permanent disability at the maximum rate 
based upon his post-injury earnings. The 
referee reported: "At the time of the in-
dustrial injury applicant was employed in 
seasonal employment, and his earnings dur-
ing the year prior to the injury, during 
a portion of which time it is contended he 
was unable to work, would not support a 
. compensation rate for permanent disability 
of maximum. However, subsequent to 
injury applicant secured steady employment 
at $387.00 per month. As he had sustained 
permanent disability before securing such 
employment, it is the Referee's opinion that 
if in such disabled condition, he was able to 
earn $387.00 per month, his earning capac-
ity at the time of injury was undoubtedly 
no less than that." (31 Cal.Comp.Cases 
41, 42.) 
The board denied reconsideration. The 
employer sought a writ of review contend-
ing that the referee could not properly de-
termine earning capacity at time of injury 
by reference to earnings from post-injury 
employment; therefore, Pargaz was enti-
tled to compensation at the minimum rate. 
The Court of Appeal denied the writ. 
Likewise, in Esparza v. Regents of the 
University of California (1966) 31 Cal. 
Camp. Cases 433, the appeals board con-
sidered potential future earnings in deter-
mining earning capacity. There the ap-
plicant, who expected to receive his master's 
degree within six months, suffered injuries 
while working part-time as a student re-
search assistant. The board, on reconsider-
ation, found that the applicant, but for the 
accident, would have received maximum 
earnings after he obtained his degree. The 
board, citing Argonaut Ins. Co. v. In-
dustrial Ace. Com, supra, 57 Cal.2d 589, 21 
Ca1.Rptr. 545, 371 P.2d 281, recognized its 
obligation to predict the applicant's earning 
capacity; therefore, it considered his train-
ing, employment opportunities in his field, 
and his willingness to work, and concluded 
that his earnings for purposes of perma-
nent disability were maximum. 
[5] In the instant case petitioner 
worked part-time over a period of many 
years so that she could remain at home with 
her children. After her injury, however, 
when two children had married and the 
third had entered his last year of high 
school, she obtained full-time, permanent 
employment, thus demonstrating her will-
ingness and ability to work at a job which 
would justify more than minimum benefits . 
The conditions which led petitioner to work 
only part-time. thereby limiting her earn-
ings, had ceased to exist. Accordingly, in 
making its deterrriiration of her permanent 
disability award, the appeals board should 
have examined all of the relevant facts, 
including petitioner's earning capacity as 
demonstrated by her ability to hold a full-
tiffi:e, permanent job. In the words of the 
referee in Dole v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
supra,31 Cal.Comp.Cases 41, 42: "[I]f in 
such disabled condition, * * * [she] was 
able to earn * * * [$82 per week] * * 
[her] "earning capacity at the time of in-
jury was undoubtedly no less than that." 
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We conclude that we cannot support the support an award 'above the minimum com .. 
board on either of;its projected hypotheses. pensation rate.: The Court's holding herein 
If, under Labor Code section 4453, sl1bdivi- that the board must give "due considera-
sion (d), it gave "due consideration" to tion" to post-injury earnings in the circum-
petitioner's post-injury. earnings,' it 'has stances of this case includes by necessary 
faiJed to explain why it disregarded such implication a holding that the board could 
earnings, thereby violating -section _ 59085' properly award compensation above the 
of the Labor Code. I f it based. its decision minimum 'if, after consideration of post. 
solely upon' petitioner's actllal earnings at injury earnings, it determined that the 
the date of- injury, refusing to give "due applicant's earning capacity at the time 
consideration" to'a showing of her earning of the inju~y was greater than that demon· 
capacity by means of her post-injury earn· strated by her pre·injury work history. 
ings, it has not followed the precept of sub- The Court's construction of Labor Code 
division (d), as demonstrated 'by logical section 4453, subdivision (d), appears to me 
construction and supporting decisiot:J.s. to be inconsistent not only with the Ian· 
The -decision of the Workmen's Compen· guage of the section but with our decision 
sation Appeals Board is annulled and the in Argonau_t: Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. 
case is remanded to that board for further Com. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 589, 21 Cal.Rptr. 
proceedings consistent with-the views here- 545, 371. P.2d 281. Furthermore, it invites 
in expressed. injured employees with a history of season· 
PETERS, MOSK and SULLIVAN,.J]., 
concur. 
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. 
The Conrt annuls the award in this case 
on the ground' that the dedsion of the 
board is ambiguous in failing to set forth 
the evidenc'e retied on and the reason for 
the decision, thus leaving' open the possi-
bility that the board did not give,"due con-
sideration" to post-injury earnings but 
based the compensation rate solely on the 
applicant's actual earnings at the time of 
her injury rather than her earning ca-
pacity. Although the board's decision 
might well have been more explicit, I do' 
not agree that the award must be annulled. 
Nor do I agree that in this case' the board 
mUst consider post·injury earnings. There 
is 'no evidence that the applicant ever 
sought employment on other than a part-
time seasonal basis prior to her injury. 
It is therefore my opinion that evidence 
of post·injury earnings from full-time eht-
ploym.ent is irrelevant to a determination 
of earning capacity ~t the time of the in· 
jury. 
The applicant concedes that her employ· 
ment history before her injury would not 
al or part-time e'mployment to accept full-
time employment prior to the hearing be-
fore the referee in order to obtain a possi-
ble windfall at the expense of the carrier. 
The purpose of subdivision (d) is "to 
equalize for compensation purposes the po. 
sitton of the full-time, regularly employed 
worker whose earning capacity is merely 
a multiple of his daily wage and that 
of the worker whose wage at the time of 
the injury may be aberrant or, otherwise 
a distorted basis for estimating true earn· 
ing power." (Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Indus· 
trial Ace. Com., supra, 57 Cal.2d 589, 594, 
21 Cal.Rptr. 545, 547, 371 P.2d 281, 283. 
Italics added.) Thus, when a' regularly 
employed' worker for reasons beyond his 
control, 'such as illness, strikes, lay offs, 
temporary recession, or other factors af· 
feeting the opportunity for full-time em-
ployment in his customary .occupation, is 
receiving a wage at the time of his injury 
that does not fairly reflect his earning 
capacity as suggested by his work history, 
subdivision (d) permits the board to con-
sider that history and other relevant in· 
for~ation in determining his earning ca· 
pacity. Conversely, as we held in Argo-
naut, if at the "time of his injury the worker 
is' employed full-time as a permanent em· 
ployee, but his work history establishes 
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that he has had irregular employment at 
low wages over a long period of time and 
the current employment' is only for the 
duration of a particular job, it is incon-
sistent with the purpose of the statute to 
base a permanent disability· award solely 
on the high wage he is fortuitously-earning 
at the time of the injury. (57 Cal.2d at 
589, 594, 21 Cal.Rptr. 545, 371 P.2d 281.) 
The present case should be governed by 
these fnles. If an award may not be based 
solely on a high wage fortuitously being 
earned at the time of an injury when 
there is a history of irregular, part-time 
work becanse the wage at the time of the 
injury is aberrant, it follows that where 
there is no evidence of willingness to 
accept other than seasonal or part-time 
work 'prior to the injury, earning capacity 
at the time of the injury cannot properly 
be determined on the basis of post-injury 
earnings from full-time employment in an-
other occupation. An applicant's willing-
ness and opportunities to work are rele-
vant to his earning capacity. (Argonaut 
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 57 
Cal.2d 589, 595, 21 Cal.Rptr. 545, 371 P.2d 
281.) A worker who is not available for 
full-time regular work or who chooses to 
work seasonally limits his own earning ca-
pacity voluntarily by his unwillingness to 
work when opportunities to do so are 
available. 
Subdivision (d) of Labor Code section 
4453 requires that the average weekly 
earnings nbe taken at 95 percent of the 
sum which reasonably represents the aver-
age weekly earning capacity of the injured 
employee at tlte time of the injury 
* * *." (Italics added.) Post-injury 
earnings of an' employee who became will-
ing to accept full-time worl<. only after the 
injury are not relevant to his earning 
capacity at the time of the injury when 
his willingness and availability were sub-
ject to self-imposed limitations. The cases 
on which the majority opinion relies, for 
the proposition that post-injury earnings 
may be considered were not concerned with 
post-injury earnings, but with factors other 
than actual earnings existing at the time 
of the injury. In Colonial Mut. Compensa-
tion Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1941) 
47 Cal.App.2d 487; 118 P.2d 361, California 
Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial 
Ace. Com. (1933) 135 Cal.App. 746, 27 
P.2d 782, and A~tna Life Ins. Co. v. In-
dustrial Ace. Com. (1933) 130 Cal.App. 
488, 20 P.2d 372, the question was the 
earning capacity of an employee whose 
earnings during the year prior to his in-
jury had been low as a result of temporary 
illness or other cause that prevented his 
working during that year, but whose work 
history demonstrated that he possessed a 
significantly greater earning capacity. In 
the Colonial case the conrt adopted the 
reasoning of the two earlier cases that in 
such circumstances Han amount based only 
upon the average sum which he actually 
received during that year, regardless of 
the unusual conditions affecting his em-
ployment, would not fairly represent his 
earning capacity." (47 Cal.App.2d 487, 491, 
118 P.2d 361, 363. Italics added.) I agree 
with that reasoning and with the result 
in those cases. The holdings are entirely 
consistent with section 4453, subdivision 
(d), and with Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., supra, 57 Cal.2d 589, 21 
Cal.Rptr. 545, 371 P.2d 409. The Court's 
extension of those cases to encompass 
post-injury earnings in addition to factors 
existing at the time of the injttry is un~ 
warranted. Nothing in those cases sug-
gests that the court contemplated consider-
ation of circumstances subsequent to the 
injury in determining earning capacity. 
Neither those cases, nor Argonaut, are 
authority for the Court's holding herein. 
Finally, Dole v. Industrial Acc. Com. 
(1966) 31 Ca1.Comp.Cases 41, is distin-
guishable from the present case. The 
referee's report and recommendation on 
reconsideration in that case notes that the 
employee had held full-time employment for 
a three-year period fonowed by four years 
of sporadic employment immediately prior 
to the injury. He had been discharged 
from the full-time employment because of 
wage attachments. His employment at the 
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time of the injury was seasonal and his and students who because of age and the 
earnings would not support a maximum necessity to complete their farnial educa-
award. He contended that he was unable tion cannot undertake full-time employ-
to 'work for a part of the year prior to his 
tnJury. "Subsequent to injury applicant 
secured steady employment at. $387.00 per 
month. As he had sustained. permanent 
disability before securing such employment, 
it is the Referee's opinion that if in such 
disabled condition he was able to earn 
$387.00 per month, his earning capacity 
at the time of injury was undoubtedly no 
less than that." (31 Cal.Comp.Cases 41, 
42.) There is no showing regarding the 
reason the worker engaged in seasonal 
employment over a four-year period. It is 
a permissible inference that he was un-
skilled and ul).able to obtain full-time work: 
Furthermore, he may have been prevented 
by health from obtaining full-time work. 
In sum, the case does not stand for the 
proposition that a worker who is volun-
tarily unavailable for work except on a 
seasonal basis for over twenty years is. en;. 
titled to a maximum award because he ob-
tained full-time employment for the first 
time in his life after the injury. Esparza 
v. Regents of the University of California 
(1966) 31 Cal.Comp.Cases 433, is similarly 
distinguishable. The board there took in-
to consideration the willingness of the em-
ployee, who was a student, to work. He 
had worked part-time during the semester 
and full-time during his vacation. That 
the Legislature contemplated application of 
a standard acknowledging intent to obtain 
full-time employment in the future for stu'"" 
dents is apparent from -section '445"5' l()f. the 
Labor Code,1 whiCh requires that a :~~~l 
manent disability award to 'a':':tnirtor: re'fleet 
the earnings he probably would pave :re-
ceived at age 21. It is 6b~ious that":dif-
ferent policy considerations apply to mhlors 
, .', _:" I 
I. "If the injured employee is, under" 2~ 
years of age, an'd bis incapacity is petma~L!'. 
nent, bis average weekly earnings shall'be 
tleemed, within the limits fixed in Section 
4453. to, be the weekly sum which under 
ordinary circumstances he would probabl;t 
be able to earn at the age of 21 years, 
in the occupation in which he was 'em-
ment. 
Post-injury earnings may be- relevant to 
the determination of earning capacity in 
some circumstances. If an employee of-
fers evidence that he was actively seeking 
full-time employment or employment at a 
higher wage when he was injured, the fact 
that he later obtains such employment is 
relevant to establishing his competency to 
fill the desired position. Here, however, 
the applicant had worked seasonally as a 
cannery worker for more than twenty years 
prIor to the injury. Only once 'had she 
sought other employment. In 1958 she was 
self-employed as an agent for a dry clean-
er, but returned to seasonal cannery work 
because her earnings were not enough. 
Throughout the balance of her employment 
career, from 1937 to the time of the injury 
in 1966, she chose to' work on a seasonal 
basis. There is no evidence in the record 
from which it can be inferred that in 1966 
the applicant was wi1ling and able to accept 
full-time employment in her post-injury oc-
cupation or any other. Therefore, her 
post-injury earnings are in no way rele-
vant to her earning capacity at the time 
of the injury. 
No purpose would be served by annulling 
the award to permit the board to prepare 
a decision with recitals of evidence and' 
reasons for the decision. There is no evi-
dence upon which an award above the 
minimum could be sustained. 
I .would ~ffirm the aw'ard. 
McCOMB and BURKE, JJ., concur. 
Rehearing' denied i McCOMB and 
BURKE, JJ., dissenting. 
ployed at tbe time of the injury or in any 
OCcl1potion to which he would' reasonably 
hove been promotell if he bml not been in-
jured. If such probable earnings at the 
age of 21 years cannot reasonably be de-
terminell, his average weekly earnings 
shall be taken at eighty dollars and 
seventy·seven cents ($80.77.)" 
